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In a famous opinion, (1) rendered as early as 184C,Chief Justice Taneyof

the United States

Supreme Court,made

use of the following significant expression:

any State

"If

deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits in,.
jurious to its citizens,and calculated to produce idleness,
vice,

or debauchery,

I

see nothing in

the United States to prevent

it

the ConstitUtion of

from regulating and restrain.

ing the traffic,or from prohibiting it altogether,if it
thinks prope:r."

The traffic

in

intoxicating

assumed such gigantic proportions,
so much miser , and want,

and in

beverages has

is the direct cause of

manifold wa,s

is

such a

menace to the public welfare ,that Legislatures of many
States have endeavored to check or control,or to eradicate
its evils.

In order to accomplish this result, the highest

power in each State has been called into exercise,and laws
have been enacted,the ostensible object of which has been
"to prevent

intemperance,pauperism

and crime,"

but which, in

many inst~nceshave virtually resulted in the prohibition
of either

the manufacture,importation

or sale of intoxicarits,

thus raising constitutional questions,as to whether such
legislation is properly within the Police Power of the State.
But it is necessar,, to have a clear conception of the

nature and extent of the police Eower itself before attempting to determine whether a particular instance of
legislation comes within its purview.

This power is

incapable of an- very exact definition or limitation, for
upon it depend the security of social order, the life

and health of the citizen, the enjoy ment of private and
and the beneficial use of propert,1.

social life,
IM'.

Justice Field says

(1), that it is "the power of the

state to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals,

education and good order of the people,

and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develope its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity."
Cooley (2)

This definition, taken with those of Judgeo
and Mr. justice Blackstone (3),

presents as

comprehensive an idea of the scope and operation of this
power as could well be embodied in the same number of
words.

The maxium,

" Salls populi suprema lex"

was early recognized as fundamental,

and the power of

the State in all matters pertaining to the general welfare of the people became omnipotent

and co-extensive

with that absolute and unlimited legislative power, which,
within itself, ever,, sovereign State must possess.

It is

said b-- JJdge Selden (I)
iyentt

that,

"it is true tlhat,

as govern.

instituted for beneficent purposes, atid to pro-

is

it

mt-ethe welfare of the govertA41,
to enact a

law which is

plainly

has no moyral right

rcpugnant to reason and

But this principle belongs to the science of

justice.

political ethics, and not that of law.

There is no ar-

biter beyond the State itself to determine what le-islation is

just.

The union of the functions of

deciding upon laws
legislative power.

iaking and

constitutes,of necessity, absolute
Wh-ile,

therefore, the right of a sov-

ereign State to pass arbitrary and tyrannical laws may,
This being self-

its legal power cannot be denied."

evident, it is clear that in a perfectly natural and
simple distribution of governmental powers,
within the power of the judiciary
act of the legislature.
power is,

it is not

to pronounce void ah-r

Thus it appears that the police

of necessity, despotic in its character and

commensurate with the sovereignty of the State.

It is

not surprising, therefore, that legislative bodies have
often disregarded the spirit of liberty and justice, and
under the guize of an exercise of this power, have sacrificed both public and private rights.

English monarchs,

in this manrer,so often oversteppdthe bounds of justice,

and trampledupon the liberties of their subjects, that,

Charta,

rulers

to grant successively

they restrain

preroffative;
Parliament,

The 1Jan.-n

of Right,

The Petition

The Bill of Rights,

These are royal

concessions.

merely the exercise

of the rpyal

The Act of Settlement.
such,

and have cor.miielled

attempts to violate tieu,

arbitrary

their

have resisted

rights,

their

time to time have asserted,
various

the people from

from such tyranny,

to protect themselves

but rather secure to it,

the right of abso"Parliament is

Laws intended to promote the welfare of

omnipotent".

and can

society are within its leg-islative discretion,
not be the subject of judicial animadversion. It
power to disregard fundamental principles
and unjust enactments;

(1)

"has, the

and pass

but it cannot do this

and it has the power to do so simply because

rightfully,

there is no written constitution
ityT springs

or on which it

Courts can test the validit

from which its author-

depends,
-

and by which the

of its declared will."

recourse to the ballot box or to rebellion are the

Thus,
only

As

the power of the British

they do not limit

lute and uncontrolled legislation.

arbitrary

and

remedies for

people.

In

unjust le',:islat ion open to the English

Great Britain,

Parliament

is

recojnized as

rightfully exercising the complete legislative authority
of the countr-y:

in

th2 Aerican States the absolute power

of legislation resides in
ganized body politic.

as an or-

the people themselves,

This sovereignty of th2 people is

an underlying principle of all free goveritent,and upon it
our ancestry ordained and established rot onl,, the Constitution of the several States,but also that of the United
States.

In

the delegation of their power,the people took

care to separate the legislative,executive and judicial
functions;

and it

was their evident intention that the

exercise of each should rest in a separate department.
Thus, "under our system of government,with co-ordinate
brancheseach independent within its sphere,and all deriving their power from a coimmon sourcethe fundamiental

law,

one cannot exercise a supremecy! over the other,except as
it findswarrant for it in that law."
To no branch of our government has such"a supremecy"
ever

been greted by the Constitution; but, instead, a

"system of check and balances" has been adopted,

which

imposes certain rest'rictions upon each department,

arid

under which the judiciary has acquired the power to annul
such legislative acts as are contrarynot

to natural

justice

Constitutional

and equity, but to certain express
provisions.

Although there is

holding that,"

when a statute

contrary

good government,

or to those cardinal principle of the

it

is

it

it

clearly

now definitely settled that no court has

appears to be repugnrant
vested rights,or

in its judge-

to reason,to

to violate

of our Republican institutioni,
the guardians

is

never-

void,"

the right to nullify a law simply because,
ment,

it

government,

the power of the Court to pronounce

theless,

and enter

islation

le,

all

, which under

into the frame-work of representative
in

spirit

to t!e

or to the fundamentals of justice and

drawn from it,

compact

is

and the implicatiorns necessarily

of the constit ition

social

reason arid authority for

the first

subvert
principles

for the courts are not
except

of the rights of the people,

as

those rights are secured by some constitutional provision
which comes within judicial co-nizance.
In

order to secure the blessin-s

selves and their

posterity,

Constitution deemed it

the framers
expedient

to

of liberty

of the Federal

to place

strictions

upon the power of the State;

instrument

contained so few positive

them-

certain rebut the ori-inal

restraints

that,

during the century of our Constitutional history,

it

has

become necessary, as

the ex! ;encies of the times have
further

demanded, to make amendments which would atill
protect our liberties.

"

History repeats itself;

"an(." vihus,ever

i ri

mi$dful o.

the ma1Ter 7:,flich their rijits arid privilages

had been abused,
power,

and fearin; the ag-ressivc

tet[dency of

the people of the several Status have limited

their legislatures, in the exercise of what would otherwise be,

plenary

power, by incorporating into their re-

spective constitutions those provisions in the nature of
bills of rights, which
termed, "

Chancellor Kent has so aptly

,,art of the muniments of freenen, showing

their title to protection."

But for these constit'i-

tional provisions, the police power of the State might
be exercised with most despotic severity;
they restrain that

"

as it is,

right hand of sovereignty" in n

ier-

our particulars relating to life, liberty, property, contract, religion, and
ages and imrmiwn

.Ir.

ties

Justice Swayne

pursuit, and make secure the privilof our citizens.

"They are,"

(1)," a bulwark of defense,

never be made an engine of oppression. "

sa ,s

and can

To these con-

stitutional guaranties alone, is the police power of
the legislature subject.

That power extends to all re,-

ulations prouiotive of the health,

ood order,

iorals,

peace and safetly of society, and is exercised on a great
variety of subjects,

and in

almost numberless va7Ts;

but under the pretense of presci'ibing a police

regulation

the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon an,, of
the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution
intended to secure against abridgement.

"It is

the

province of the law making power to det Jrmirie whern the
exigen c y

exists for calling into exercise the police

power of the State (1)
exercise is

,

but what are the subjects of its

clearly a judicial question."

:iany fla-

grant and indefensible invasions of private rights have
occurred in

the Legislative history of our countr1y,

these have given rise to muc
stitutional questions,

in

arid

litigation involving Con-

the consideration of which tlho

courts substantially agree

that,

whenever by a reason-

able construction) the constitutional limitations can be
made to avoid an unrikhteous exercise of the police powe;r,
that construction will be upheld,notwithstanding

the

strict letter of the Constitution does not prohibit the
exercise of such a power,"

for the Constitution,

being

the result of legislation by the l-eople themselves before
parting :'rith their power is

the paramount law.

The princi

t statutes, the constitutional validity

of which has been questioned, maay be classed as follows:
Meat

the tene:ient house

inspection laws;

act;

ci'a-

laws prohibiting the manufacture or sale of oleomargerine;
statutes

acts requiring dr-umers to take out licences;
regulating elevator and railway, charges;

and prohibitory

liquor legislation.
As the Constitution is

the only standard for the

courts to determine the question of statutory validity,
it should be comparatively easy for the courts
xYvether a particular

law is

without

tive authority and therefore
ry

examination

void;

of the caseswill

the pale of legislabut,

reveal,

as even a
there

great diversity in the judicial holdiigs.
ing as to the escential principles,

to decide

is

71hile

cursoa
-cgree-

the tendency of the

United States Supreme Court is to declare valid all acts
which are even ostensibly police relilations

and which

do not violate an express inhibition of the Constitution;
whereas,

that of the State courts and especially

New York Court of Appeals,
as are actually police
contravene
provision.

4is to hold valid

regulations,

of the

onl,

such

and which do not

the liberal interpretation of a Consitutional
This difference of opinion as to

the extent

to which a State may exercise its

police power,

and still

not infringe upon private rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is one of g1-ave importance,

articles by famous

subject of much discussion and nmeri
law-ers,,

philosophers, statesmen

all the classes before mentioned,

and has be..n th

and j'i-ists.

And of

the Prohibitor:y Liquor

Legislation has given rise to more casesinvolving Constitutional questions of great moment, and frauht with intense interest to the people at large,

as well as to the

reformer, the politiCian,ithe legislator and the judge;
consequently, I will proceed at once to the discussion of
the constitutionality of this particular class of legislation, omitting a consideration of the others, except as
the principles evolved from them are applicable to the
subject matter in hand.
Regulation vs. Prohibition.
From an early, period in civilization,

in all

countries, the unrestricted traffic in intoxicants has
been regarded as pernicious.

"Hence as is believed, in

the code of laws in every civilized State, it has at all
times been regulated and put under restraint.

In this

respect it has formed an exception to other le'-itimate
business, and it is believed to have

-es ilted from humane

feelings

and a

and disorder,
train.

This

desire

to suppress

and the othe r

of any particular

miseries

political

not

is

(1),

restraint

immorality , vice,

faith,

crime
its

that follow in

the peculiar growth
or an:

creed or

sect,

but seems to be a desire implanted in our nature to protect our race and kind from such evil;

and it

is implant-

ed in the police power of the State, and nay be exercised
as the law-maker shall deem for the best interest of
society."

In short,

it

will be seen that in

has the power of the government
uniformly exercised,

been more steadilyl

from the beginning,

abont, and placing guards

nothing

than

and

n hedging

and restrictions upon the

traffic in intoxicating liquors, to the exclusion of all
mere natural rights.
however, (2)

that

The ass 3rtion of Judge Johnson,
"The right to restrict and regulate

includes that of prohibition,"
criticism.

It is certain that

is subject to severe
the legislature cannot

totally annihilate commerce in any species

of property

and so condemn the property, itself to extinction.
It is equallt certain that the legislature can regulate
trade in property of all kinds.
positions is denied, but the,

Neither of these pronecessarily. lead to a=Atb1er,-

that between regulation and destruction (p'.olibition)ther3

1-.

is somewhere, however difficult to define with pr-ecision,
a line of

All reasoning,

separation.

therefore,,

fa-

in

vor of upholding legislation which belongs to one class,
hecause it

is

difficult to distinguish froi t-at

often

which belongs to another,

must be fallacious,

because

it

is

simply reasoning against admitted conclusions.

It

is

quite obvioas that the end which the legislator

have in

view,

Liay

assiuming that to be the prevorition of the

evils of drinking, ma- be attained by direct and also by
indirect measures.
ication wo Id

be

"

For instance, (1) prohibiting intox-

one means;

would be another,

prohibiting drinking at all

one degree more remote;

the sale for drinking is still more remote.

prohibiting
So legisla-

tion may be carried farther and farther from the object
directly in
pose;

view;

as prohibiting the sale for any pu--

prohibiting the manufacture;

existence of liquor;

or even of those things from which

liquors can be procured."
"()so is

prohibiting even the

ToW,

though the general pur-

entirely legitimate and within the scope of leg-

islative authority,

and though direct legislation for the

attainment of that end might be free from objection,
it

by no means follows that measures

though conducive to the end in

yet,

operating remotely,

view, may not violate the

restraints of the Constitution.

And, in fact, such leg-

islation has too often weakened and impaired our
tutional safeguaards.

consti-

It is true, that, prior to the ra4-

ification of the Fourteenth Amendment on the 25th of July,
1868, there was nothing in the Constitution of the United
States, except "the glittering generalities" of the Preamble,

to prevent a State from regulating and restrict-

ing the traffic or from prohibiting it altogether,there was nothing by which the,constitutionalit:, of a prohibitory liquor law could be tested.

But in the full-

ness of their wisdom and experience, our forefathers had
provided for just such an emergency by incorporating into
the several State constitutions certain simple and comprehensive provisions,

substantially declaring that "no

member of this State (1) shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the

i"

judgment of his peers"; and "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law;(2)nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."

The true interpretation

of these phrases is, that where rights are acquired by
the citizen under th. existing law, tlere is no power in

any branch of the govern ment to take them away;

and

thus, many measures of restraint and prohibition have been
assailed as repugnant to the State constitutions,

al-

though they were enacted by State Legislatures in the exercise of the police power and in accordance with the doctrines Taid down
enunciated

in the Licence Cases

(1),

and the principles

therein by the learned Chief Justice Taney,

and Justices Grier and Mc Lean.

But in general, a public

sentiment against the traffic in intoxicants, which was
sufficiently strong in a State to bring about the enactment of prohibitory laws,

has proved itself equally

powerful in repelling attempts to invalidate those laws;
so that the decisions in the cases, Yiynehamer V. The People
(2),

Beebe V. The State

(3),

and The State V. Vfalruff (4)

stand out in sharp and shining contrast to many decisions
of other State courts, and especially to those rendered in
the United States Supreme Court in the cases of similar
import,

which Uave been carried before tmat aLust

since the adoption of Amendment XIV.

body

The decisions

in this line of cases have depended more particulary upon
the scope and construction given by the courts to the so
called "property clauses";

and, therefore,

before pro-

ceeding to the discussion of the constitutionality of laws

prohibiting either

the sale,

keeping,

or mi-

rarnufacture,

portation of ardent spirits, it will be well

to devote

some space to the consideration of - whether one can have an,;
Property in Intoxicating Liquors,
and,

if

so,

whether the right of property in

extensive and inviolable
property.

as that in

them is

as

any other species of

There can be no doubt that intoxicating liquor

is property.

It is a chattel,an article of use, of con-

sumption and of conmmerce,

and is

property irn the strict-

est legal and constitutional sense.

From the earliest

ages intoxicants have been produced and consumed as a
beverage,
portance
the right

and have constituted an articie of great imin

the commerce of the world.

of property

for an instant

in

them was never,

questioned.

and sold like other property;

In

owner dies,

the subject
their

value

country

so far as I know,

In this state they are bough't
the,: are seized and sold

on legal process for the pa7-.ient of debts;
other goods,

this

of actions

they are, like

of law;

and when the

constitutes a fund for

the bene-

fit of his creditors, or goes to his children and kindred
according to law or the will of the deceased.

The:- enter

lar-el,- into the foreign and internal cor-mierce of the
state, even the United States Supreme Court

(1) reco-niziji;

them to be " merchantable commodities and known articles
It ma,

of commerce."

be said, it is true, that intoxi-

cating drinks are a spocies of propertU which performs
no

beneficent

part in the political, moral, oo social

economy of the world.

It niay bc urged, and I will admit,

demonstrated with reasonable certainty, that the abuses
to which it is liable are so great,that the people,

even

of this State, can dispense with its very existence, not
only without

injury to their aggregate interests, but

with absolute benefit.
is not in plilospphie

But "the foundation of property
or scientific speculations, nor

even in the suggestions of benevolence oi philanthropy
It is simple and intelligible proposition, admitting in
the nature of the case of no qualification,
is

that that

property which the law of the land recofriizes

It is,

as s..ch.

in short, an institution of the law, and not a re-

sult of speculation in

science,

morals or economy. "

These observations, while quite elenmentar,-,

4irectlyT to the conclusion that all
the characteristic of inviolability.

lead

property is alike in
If the Legislature

has no power to confiscate and destroy property in general.
it has no such power over any particular species.

If in-

toxicating liquor is property, the Constitution does not

permit a legislative estimate to be made of its usefulness,
with

a

destruction.

view to its

In

a word, that which

belongs to the citizen in the sense of property, and as
such has to him a commrercial value, cannot be pronounced
worthless or pernitiots, and so destroyed and deprived
of its essential attributes.
Having thus satisfactorily demonstrated that intoxicating liquor is property in the most absolute and unqualified sense of the term, and as such is as much entitled to the protection of the Constitution as land, houses
and chattles of any description,

I am confronted with

that somewhat serious question,-

Can the owner of intox-

icants virtually be deprived of any of those rights which
are the very essence of property and which of necessity
accompany its possession ?

Now,

I can form no notion of

property which does not include the essential characteristics and attributes with which it is clothed b, the
laws of society.

In the state of nature, property

not exist at all.

"

did

Every man might then take to his use

what he pleased (1), and retain it if he had sufficient
power;

but when man entered into society, arid industry,

arts and sciences were introduced, property wls gained by
various means, for the securing whereof proper laws were

ordained."

iaterial objects, therefore, are proljerty- in

the true sense, because they are impressed by the laws
and Lisages of society with certain qualities, among which
are,

fundamentally,

the right of the occupant or the

owner to use and enjoy them exclusively,
power to sell and dispose of them;

and his absolute

and as property con-

sists in the artificiLU, impression of these qialities upon
material things,

so whatever removes the impression de-

:-

stroys the notion of property, although the thitigs themselves may remain physically untouched.

Thus, while it

has been generally conceded that state legislatures have
the power to regulate the sale of intoxicatiig liquors,
statutes which go still further,and undertake to

.holly

prohibit the manufactu-e, importation or sale of all intoxicating beverages, have been fiercely

assailed on con-

stitutional grounds as violations of the rights of property/;

and, for the purposes of the present discussion,

the topics to be separately considered are tabulated as
follows : The Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting I.-

The Sale of Previously Acquired Liquors,

2.-

The Sale of Subsequentl:

3.-

The Keeping of Liquors,

Acquired Liquors,

(over)

4.-

The Manufacture of Liquors,

5.-

The Importation of Liquors,,

The Constitutionality of laws prohibiting

the

Sale of Previously Acquired Liquors.

Having established from admitted premises, that a
person can have propert,T in intoxicants, the question
which now presents itself is,-

whether or riot a person

who was the owner of liquor in - State at the time such a
statute went into effect is absolutely prohibited from
selling or disposing of it.

I can find no definition of

property which does not include the power of disposition
and sale as well as the right of p rivate use and enjoyment,
Thus, Blackstone says (1)
every7

, "The third absolute right

of

Englishman is that of property, which consists in

the free use,

nnjoymernt and disposal of all his acquisi-

tions without an,- control or diminution,
laws of the land."

Chancellor Kent sa-s

save only for the
(2),

"The ex-

clusive right of using and transferring property follows
as a natural consequence from the perception and admission
of the right

itself."

Indeed, it is impossible to

con-

ceive of property,, eliminated o2 its attributes, inca;able

of sale, and placed without the protection of the law.
The abolition of all right of sale in a State is equivalent to and is a substantial deprivation of the owner of
his proper-ty.

The right of sale is of the ver7T essence

of property in -n- article of merchandize;
chief characteristic;

it is its

take away its vendible quality,

and the article itself, though not physically,
cally destroyed, being deprived of that

is practi-

qualit. which

gives it its chief value, and for which its possession is
mainly desirable.

A

-ian m,-ay be deprived of his property:

in a chattel, therefore, without its being seized,i -:
physically destroyed, or taken from his possession.
Whatever subverts his rights in regard to it, annihilates
his property in it;

and it is not pretended, nor can it

be, that property which is not per se a nuisance, can be
annihilated by the for ce of a statute alone.
not a nuisance per se

,

legislative declaration.

"Liquor is

nor can it be made so by, a simple
It does not stand (1) in the

category of conmion nuisances, which of themselves endanger
the welfare or safet, of society-.

It is its use and

abuse as a beverage which gives its offensive character;
A

otherwise,

it

recognized

by the law as prole3"t -,

is

entirel-

inoffensive."

That liquor is

that the Constitution

knows no distinction

in its guaranties of the rights of

property of all kinds,

and that the constitutionality of

a law is to be tested, the same as though it related to
some other and perhaps better species of property,
be questioned.

cannot

The Constitution surrounds liquor as

property with the same inviolability as any other species
of property;

and consequently when this

first

presented and passed upon in

case,

it

court.

was decided in

question was

the famous 7T'nehamer

the negative,

though b. a divided

This leading case was brought to test the con-

stitutionality of an act (1)

of the Legislature of the

State of Hew York, providing that any one selling or offering to sell, o~r having in his possession with intent
to sell or give away,

any intoxicating liquor, should be

fined on conviction and the liquors
licensedto sell,

forfeited, unless

which licence restricted the sales to

mechanical, chemical, medicinal, or sacramental purposes.
Any officer

had the right

to seize the liquor so illegal-

1:' offered or kept for sale,

or with intent to give it

away, and arrest the offender.

On conviction the liquor

.':as destroyred and the vessels containing it
costs.

sold to pay

The owner of the liquor, by express provisions

was debarred brdnging any suit for its

conversion.

Wynehamer owned liquor at the time of the ericat!.ient of
the Statute, and when it went into force.

Having sold a

portion thereof, he was indictedand convicted b,

a common

law jury, in the Court of Sessions in Erie County

"

selling liquors in small

for

quantities contrary to the'Act

for the prevention of intemperence,pauperism and crime'
passed April 0th, 1855".

His

conviction was affirmed

by the Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgement of the two lower courts, and held, "That the
prohibitor) act,

in its operation upon property in intox-

icating liquors existing in the hands of an, person within
this state when the law took effect, is a violation of
the provision of the constitution of this State which declares that no person shall be

'deprived of life, liberty

or property,without due process of law!

That the various

provisions, prohibitions and penalties contained in the
act do substantially destroy the property in -uch liquors
in violation of the terms and spirit of the constitutional
provision."

Though the arguments presented in the

disscting opinion of Judge T. A. Johnson, and concurred
in

bY Judges 7-,-ight

and

M.itchell,

are very valuable,

and

entitled to careful consideration, yet the thorough, logical, and elaborate opinions, composing the prevailin-

decision,

and delivered by Chief Justice Denio and Jad!es

Comstock, Alex. S. Johnson, Hubbard, and Seldenconvince
the thoughtful student

Justice Miller for

met the approval of 71r.
V.

a dictum b- him reads thus;

Iowa (1)

authority

heretofore

soundness,

of their

is

overwhelming,

and evidently
in
"The

'lartemeyer
,.iei!ht of

that no such inmulity has

existed as would prevent state

legislatures
in

from regulating and even prohibiting the traffic
toxicating drinks, with a
ception is
property in
lutel.

in

the case

solitar

-

exception.

of a law operating so rigidl:y

existence at the time of its

rohibiting

its

owner of his property. "

That

sale,

passage,

inexon

abso-

as to amount to depriving the

The Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting the
Sale tf Subsequently Acquired Liquors.

reached this

Having

hibitoa-, of the

conclusion respecting laws pro-

sale of intoxicants previously

does it necessarily follow that laws

acqui-I-d,

rohibiting

the sale

of subsequently acquired liquors are tuiconstitutional ?
So it

would seebi ,vievredfroma purely

but, practically.,

theoretical

standpoint,

it is not so, as there is a radical dif-

ference between the two classes respecting both their
legal

status

agencies

as property,

effecting them.

the concensus
it

and the exterior

of judicial

would be competent

As

has already been intimated,

authority7
for

influences and

is

to the effect that

a State legislature

to pass an

act prohibiting the sale of intoxicants, provided such act
is plainly and distinctly prospective, as to the property
on which it should operate.
ing is

this

position

John Stuart M.ill who,
that,

"

But,by what course of reason-

reached ? Evidently
in

his

work "On Liberty"1,
.

Mankind are greater gainers b

to live as seems good to themselves,

And .ews,

suffeuir

determines
each other

than by compelling

each to live as seems good to the rest";
William S.

not b-- tI-.t of

nor by

that of

when he reach es the conclusion that,

"An excise law to be just

should have for o its

pu-Iose

the

(1)

25.

maintenance of public order without imposing

or permit-

ting any infringment upon the personal liberty of th2
citizen."

The true reasons, vihen sought for,

else'ihere.

are found

In determining the scope of the police

power I concluded that it was confined to the imposition
of burdens and restrictions upon the righits of individuals,
in

order to prevent injury to others;

or in

other words,

that it consisted in the application of measures for the
enforcement of the legal maxi~um,
nurn non laedas.

1

fl"Sic utere tuo,ut aliD-

The objectsof the police power are

the prevention of crime,

and the protection of rights

against the assault of others;

and consequently) it

cannot be brought into operation for the purpose of exacting

pbedience to the rules of morality/, and banishing

vice and sin from the world.

It is

,niversally admitted

that no trade can be subjected to police regidlations of
an- kind, unless its prosecution involves some harm or
injury to the pblic at lagte,

or to third persons (1);

and in ever-, case the regulations camnot extend beyond the
evil that is so restrained.

However, while it is true

that vice, as vice, can never be the subject of police
regulations, no man can claim the i-ght to ,fake a trade
of vice.

A business which panders to vice, wlich has for

its

object or necessary

consequence

the provision of

means for the indulgence of a vicious propensity or desire,
may, and always should be strenuously prohibited;
is upon this ground that legislation absolutely

and it
prohib-

iting the sale of intoxicating liquor as a beverage, is
mainly/ upheld as a proper exercise

of the police power.

There are many prominent legal writers and jurists
opposed to all

"such su-mptuary

among whom are Mr.

William S.

and Judge Perkins,

of Indiana.

former (1);
does no harm.

legislation",

who are

prominent

Andrews of New York City,
To quote from the I'-.

"The mere act of selling intoxicants
The evil or injury results

or, more strictly,

their

misuse.

It

is

from their

use,

necessarythere-

fore, only to reach and control those who misuse them to the
injury and detriment of others."

And the latter"to

satisfy his judgement arid conscience" declared a prohibitoiy law of Indiana
"The

unconstitutional, holding that,

(2)

court knows as a matter of general knowledge and is

capable

of judicially

asserting the fadt that the use of

beer etc. as a beverage, is not necessarily hurtful, any
more than the use of lemonade

or icecream.

abuse,

these beverages

and not the use of all

hurtful.

But the legislature

It is the
that is

enacted the law in

question upon the assumption that the manufacture and
sale of beer were necessarily destructive to the Cormnunity;

and in acting upon that assumption, it has invad-

ed unwarrantably

the right of private propert,, and its use as
The position of

a. bevbrage andan article of traffic."

these gentlemen is clearly erroneous in the light of the
previous disussion of this topic;

and, in fact,

the

decision of Judge Perkins has since been overrulled so
that at present the courts of Indiana

agree with the ma-

jority of our states and federal courts in sustaining as
constitutional all prohibitory liquor legislation which
is plainly prospective in its operation.

2,

The

Constitutionality

Liaws

of

Prohibiting

the Keeping of Intoxicants.

Besidos the question hefeinbefore
WYVnehamer

case raised another as

section of the act,

the

discussed,

to wheth-er the Ist

the constitutionalit-

of which was

assailed, taken in connection with 4th section, could be
reconciled with arny just

views of legislative

power.

That section declared in substance, that intoxicating
liquors, except as thereinafter provided, should neitheY'
be sold,

or kept for

sale or with intent

to be sold in

any

place whatsoever; or be given away, or kept with intent to
be given away,

anywhere but in

These provisions,
sale,

a private dwelling-ho use.

although they abrogated the right of

did not prohibit

vided no design was

the liquors from being kept,

entertained

of selling

them;

they prohibit thei- 0 being used by the owner..

pronor did

So far the

section ma7,r not have conflicted with the constitution.
But, it proceeded (1),
in

any place whatsoever,

as above described,

or a

"nor shall it be kept or deposited
except

in

such dyelling-houses

church or place of worship,

for

sacramental purposed,or in a place where either some chemical or mechanical, or medicinal art, requiring the use of
liquor, is carried on as a regular branch of business."

This last

against the

clause was an absolute prohibition

keeping of liquors anywhere but in the excepted pl~ces
although the owner mar
or give them away;
lation

of this

clause

have had no intention to use, sell

and the 4thsection
to be a ri;isde,-u1ioo.

declared a vioThese cer-

tainl-Y are most extraordinary provisions, having the
effect to render a person a criminal who was so unfortunate as to have a quantit, of liquor on hand in a forbidden place at the time the law took effect, although he
had no intent to violate the law by selling.

A person

thus circumstanced -vould have but one of two alternatives
to avoid criminality,

either just before the law took

effect to remove the liquor to a dwellin;-hcuse, a ch-,irch,
or a shop for mechanical or other prescribed uses, or to
destroy, it with his own hand.
the liquor on hand vhLen,

The idea of depositing all

the law took effect,

execpted places, is plainly illusory,.
that the owners might save their propert:
is

in these

A suggestion (1)
by exportation

equally so, for no State court can know judicially

that any article, the sale of which is prohibited, and
which is declared a nuisance in that State, would be

ad-

mitted is an article of merchandize into another.
Under such a law "property is lost before-c the police are

in motion,"

and,

I may add, crime is comm~itted without
In addition to these pro-

an act or even an intention.

hibitions, liquor kept contrary to them was dclared to
be a nuisance, and for an injur.- to it or

the taking it

away from the owner, he could maintain no action, unless
he proved that it was
him;"

(I ) "lawfully kept and owned by

and as this lawfulness was made to depend in all

cases upon the non-existance of an intent to sell, 4nd in
some cases,of an intent to give it away, the nearly impossible burden of making out those negatives was throvn
upon the owners.

In my judg;enment this was not a scheme

of regulation but a legal distruction of property, coming
little short of a law authorizing an officer, or any one,
directly to destroy the liquor.

There is a distinction

between a prohibition against the acquisition, possession,
or keeping of property

and the imposition of burdens

upon the property itself, or restrictions upon the use
thereof;

or between the total destruction of the rightto

acquire and possess property, and the regulation thereof
in such a manner as to prevont injury either to individuals or public rightsand promote the public welfare.
The former, the legislature is prohibited b,, the constitution from doing;the latter

that department is

not -

and
restrained from acting upon "according to its free will
sovereign pleasure."

AnaJlagous to the class of legislatihn

under condideration, are those portions of certain prohibitory" laws directing an officer, after destro-ing the
intoxicants, either to sell the vessels

containing it

to pay costs, ( Laws of Newy York 1855 p. 340),
destroy. all'sigis;

screens, bars,

or to

bottles, glasses, and

other property used in keeping arid maintaining the nuisance."

(Laws of Kansas 1885 ).

Concerning such provi-

sions Mr. Justice Fields says, (Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, at p. 678 )

"I carmot see how the protection of the

morals of the people can require the destruction of property like bottles, glasses, and other utensils,

which

may be used for many lawful purposes. 'It has heretofore
been supposed to be an established principle, that where
there is a power to abate a nisance, the abatement must be
limited b'. its necessity, and no wanton or unnecessar-7
injury can be committed to the property or rights of individuals.

Thus, if the nuisance consists in the use to

which a-building is put, the remedy is to stop such use,
not to tear down or to demolish the building itself, or to
destroy property fend within it."
is clear, that, in enacting

To me, at.least,

it

such a law, a State legislature
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passes beyond the verge of constitutional authority, and
crosses the line which separates regulation from confiscation.

And now as to the ric-ht of a State to enact
Laws

Prohibiting the Manufacture

There is no easier or more

within its own territory.
tempting opportunity fo

i

of Liquor

the exercise of tyranny than in
The zeal of the re-

the police control of occupations.

former, as well as cupidity or self-interest, must alike
be

guarded against,

as both are apt to prompt the emplQpJ-

ment of unconstitutional means to obtain the
That manufactures
(1),

so

maw per

no one denies.

be the subject of regulation

But the reason for such regulation,

wherever it has been attempted, is obvious.
incident

end desired.

to the process,

There may be

noxious smells, and generation

of poisonous gases, as in the case of rendering and ferThere may be danger of fire

talizing establishments.

or explosion, as in the manufacture of burning liquids
or explosive powders.

In all these cases the provisions

of the law are adapted to reducing the peculiar perils of
the trade to a minimum.

But in order to prohibit the

prosedution of a trade altogether, the injury to the public
which furnishes the justification
proceed from the inherent

for

such a law,

must

character of the business,

so that the trade, however conducted, and %'iatever mavr
the character of the person engag!,ed in

it,

be

mList necessari-

ly produce injury upon the public or upon some individaal

It is not enough that the thing may become

third person.
harmnful,

when put to a wrong use.

It must be in itself

harmful, and incapable of a harmless use.

Now, it

cannot

be contended that there is anything in the manufacturing
of intoxicating liquors which endangers the lives or
property of others, whatever may be the injurious results
whatever may be the differ-

or

of.its intemperate use,

once of opinion as to its sanitary qualities;

and, there-

fore, I shall endeavor in this thesis to establish that,
as this occupation is in itselfineither immoral nor noxious
to health or safety, it is not in the power of the legislature

either

*o

put it

it.

out of the way- or to destroy

I am aware that this position is opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority,

I shall attempt to present

only such arguments as will substantiate my position,
trusting that they will be of sufficient weight in and

of themselves to answer all (obeo4eis) arguments to
The present condition of the law is

the contrary.

to a line decisions in the
power has been judicially

U. S. Sup. Ct.,
granted

due,

by which a

to the States,which

no State legislature would ever have dared constitutionaly to assume.

I

refer

to the exaferation of the police

power, and the withdrawal of judicial protection from

As

in

those who have been wronged by its
v.2..Pern.
clare a

(1),

VowelJ.

it was held that the court could riot de-

law prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargerine

mconstitutional and void, as

"the judiciary

cannot

interfere without usurping the powers committed to the
legislative department.
(2),

is

more in

But the case of Mugler V.

point 'as it

of the legislature,

held thai

"If in

the

Kansas

judgement

the manufacture of intoxicating

liquor, even for the makeA own use, as a beverage, would
tend to cri.plq,

if it did not defeat the effort to guard

the community against the evils attending the excessive
use of such liquors,
their views

it is not for the courts,

upon

as to what is best and safest for the commu-

nit'7 to disregard the legislative determination."
The claim that any legislative body in this country can
absolutely destroy private rights and personal liberty,
as held in these cases, is a monstrous assumption, at-Var
with the established and axiomatic principles of free
government.

There is no such thing as arbitrary power

in our system of government.

Every function possessed

by the State was conferred by the people, to be exercised
in their interest and for their welfare, and it is limited
in

its scope by the necessity for its exercise.

iever-

theles4, with these cases and others from the same source

as authorities,

the courts of twenty-one

sustained as constitutional

laws prohibiting the mranu-

All these courts and all reason-

fature of intoxicants.
able men

States have

agree that the evils flowing from intoxicating

liquo-r arise wholly from its

use as a beverage.

As the

prohibitor,, laws attempt, not directly to' inhibit that
use,
it

but indirectly by inhibiting the sale for such use,
be said that it

ms

have in
and it

viev

.

is

the sale alone which such laws

From that all the aplprehended evils flow,

has already been shown that the sale of intoxicants

may be prohibited by laws prospective in their operation.
The sole reason that is urged for imposing any restrictions upon the manufacture of intoxicants, is, that all
manufacture

is

for the purpose of sale and-carries With it

the right of sale,

arid, therefore,

a limitation should

be imposed upon it correspondent with that upon the sale.
I fail to see how the argument applies in this case.
The proximate cause of the evil of intemperance is its
sale as a beverage, and,

because that is the subject to

police supervision and may be prohibited,

it does riot

necessarilr fellow that the manufacture may be subjected
to the same burdens.

Police regulations of the sale of

intoxicants should, and usually do, receive in a reasonabl,

health commnuiit,

the enthusiastic support of the

entire popuilation.

If

this is

true,

it

is

unnecessa-'

and unreasonable for a legislative body, under cover of
the police power, to strike down anothei.- occupation which
is

in

no way detrimental

to the safety-,

the health,

or

the morals of the public.
In most of the prohibitor, liquor legislation,
attempts are made to lessen its rigo[s by permittinC
manufacture for prescribed purposes;

the

for instance, in

the Cci,.st. of Kansas it is provided that,"

The manufacture

of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in
this State, except for medicinal, scientific and mechanical purposes, "and to these t-he Codeof Iowa
±.

and sacramental purposes."

the U. S. Sup. Ct.

adds,

"ctlina-

To uphold such provisions

has held that " a State in the exer-

cise of its undisputed power of local administration, can
enact a statute prohibiting tithin its limits the manufacture of intoxicants,

except for certain

purposes."

Of those i no advocate sich legislation, I ask, what has
the owner's state of mind in relation to his goods,

in the

process of manufacture, to do with the lawfulness or
unlawfullness of that manufacture ?
case is,

primarily?

His intent in ever:,

, to sell, whether for subsequent

exportation or use in either mechanical, medicinal,

scientific, culinary or sacramental purposes it makes no
The power to limit the sale of the rmianu-

difference.

factured liquor to these purposes undoubtedly resides in
the legislature,

but a measure

prohibitin

the man'1-

facture, except for these purposes, tho igh, perhaps,
conducive to the end in view, operates

too remotely, and

being v-ithout the pale of legislative authority,

violates

the restraints of the constitution.
But

before leaving this topic,

consider the question raised in

it

seems proper to

.Iugler V.

Kansas as to

w'hether l e-islation prohibiting the mar lifacture within
the state of intoxicanzts,
persons

who

may be enforced aginst

the

at the time happen to own property whose

chief value consists in its fitness for such manufactaring
purpose,
in

its

without compensating them for the diminution

value resulting from such prohibitor

enactments.

Looking at this question in the light of those U. S. Sup.
Ct.

decisions which grant unlimited police power to the

State Legislatures,

so that an> manufacture may, be declarc1d

unlawful and prohibited as a nuisance,

it

necessarily

follows that "a prohibition simply upon the use of propertY for purposes that are declared,
tion,

to be injurious to the

b-r valid (?)

comnity,

cannot,

legislain

just sense be deemed a taking or an appropriation of

an-,

property

for the public benefit,

govern this case,
, in

domain

as

do not involve

the p.irciples

the power of eminent

the exercise of which,

property i.ay not be

taken for public use without compensation.
holding in

.ugler

V.

Kansas,

sary conclusion as the Sup.
reverse the judgement

which was
Ct.

which

in

of the U.

of the highest

Such was the
fact,
S.

a neces-

cannot

coaurt of a

state

because of its supi~os2d conflict with the State Constitution.
laid

it,
out,

arate

to follow the line

of argument hereinbefore

and approved by Mir.

opinion to 1iugler V.

Justice Piield,

Kansas,

in

a sep-

I respectfully

insist that such prohibitory statutes exceed the bounds
of any proper exercise of the police power in condeming
buildings and machinery
as

comion nuisances;

and that they go beyond the utmost

verge of constitutional
privilegls

to confiscation and destruction

power in

and immrnsities of citizens.

sustained by, Mr. Justice Brewer
(1)

abridging the

in

rightful

This position is

an elaborate opinion

which holds that the Convt. and laws of Kansas,

above referred to,

have the effect;

person from the use of his property

first, to,debar q
for the sake of the

lublic,

and to take property for the public purposes;

second,

that natural

equity,

as well as constitutional

guaranty, Vorbids

such a taking of private property

the public- good without

for

compensation; third, if it is

the plain puv'pose and inevitable result of such legislative
enactments or prescribed forms of proceedure, judicial or
otherwise,

to despoil private property' for the benefit

of the public without compensation,
cess of law. "

it is not due pro-

:1.

The Constitutionality of Laws- Imposing Restrictions
upon Inter-State

Commerce in Intoxicants.

The relation of the police power of the States to
the commerce power of the nation, constitutes a subject
at once familiar and obscure;
characteristics,
the two

familiar in its general

and obscure where the border lines of

jurisdictions

touch each other.

To

elucidate

the

obscurities of the subject and show how apparent or real
antagonisms mato undertake

be reconciled, is too difficult a task

on this

occasion,

so this

confined to the right of a State,
policy of prohibition,
merce, and thus

discussion is

in carrying out its

to impose restraints upon Com-

to bring itself into conflict with that

clause of the U. S. Constitution which provides that
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States."
str,-

n,

this

the U. S. Si.p.

provision,
Court,

In con-

a majority of the Justices

in the License Cases (1),

of

held that

the States had authority to legislate -Lonsubjects of

inter-state

commerce until

Congress had acted upon them;

and that, as Congress had not acted,
the States was valid.

the regulation of

The doctrine thus declared, has

been modified since by repeated decisions, so that it is
now firml' established (1) that,
national in its character,
formity of legislation,

"when the subject is

and admits and requires uni-

affecting alike all

such as transportation between the States,

the States,
including the

importation of goods from one State into another, Congress
alone can act upon it and provide the needed regulations.
The absence of any law of Congress on the subject, is
equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter
shall be free."

Thus, the absence of regulations as to

inter-state commerce with reference to any particular
subject is taken as a declaration that the importation
that article shall be unrestricted.
it was decided in
that,

of

On th ese grounds

Bowman V. Chicago, etc.

Ry.

Co.

(2)

"A State cannot, for the purpose of protecting, its

people a:-ainst the evil of intemperance, enact laws which
regulate commerce between its people and those of other
States of the Union,
express or implied,

unless the consent of Congress,
is first obtained."

Indirectly involved in that case was the question
as to whether the right of transportation of an article
of commerce from one
essary implication,

State to another includes, by necthe right of the consignee to sell it

43.

in unbroken packages at the place vhere the transportation terminates.
The discussion of that question gave rise to the
I'

"Original Package Cases,(I)

so called

judiciall> determined;
is

in w,,hich it was

first, that intoxicating liquor

"the subject of exchange, barter, and traffic,

like

any other commodity in which a right of traffic exists,
arid are so recognized by the usages of the coranercial
world,
Courts;

the laws of Congress and the decisions of the
second,

"to assert that under the Consti-

that,

tution of the United States,

the iphportation of an arti-

cle.of connerce cannot be prohibited by the States,

and

yet to hold that when imported, its use and sale can be
is to declare that the right which the Con-

prohibited,

stitution gives is a barren one,
as anry benefits
third,

that,

right to sell

and to be denied so far

from such transportation are sought;"

the right of impartation carries with it
the article

imported,

the

as the framers of the

Constitution never intended that a right given should not
be so freely enjoyed;
onl-y after

importaton

and fourth, that, therefore,
is

"it

completed, and the property im-

ported has mingled with and become a part of the general
property of the State,

that police regulations can act

is

44.

except

upon it,

Kidd 7T.

as

mnay be necessary

to insure

disposition Of the import thus min-led. "

safety in the
In

so far

Mugler V. Kansas and
the
AU. S. Sup. Court
that
strange

view of th-e decisions
seems

it

Pierson,

in

cases, that

did not hol4, in the original package

icants constitute an exception to the general

"intox-

rule, and

are by reason of their dangerous character, subject to
Such a decision would have violated

State regulation."

no principle of Constitutional law as theretofore asserted in that court;

prove better for the

but it may

American people, in the end, that a majority of the court
held that it

is

the duty of Congress to make such regula-

tions of inter-state

comerce

eral welfare may require.
result

in

For,

iritoxiaarits,

though the immediate

Bowman V.

of the decisions,in

as the gen-

C.

& N.

W.

Ry.

Co.(l)

and Leis,, V. Hardin (2), was to flood the "pi-ohibition
States" with intoxicating liquors imported and sold in
"original packages",

they served to incite

the temperance

prople of the nation to prompt action which resilted
the 1{assage by Congress,

on Aug.

8,

1890,

in

of the "Yeilson

Bill" which provides that intoxicating liquors, when
shipped from one State to another, shall, upon arrival,
be subject to the opei-ation and effects of the laws of

45.

such state.

The constituality

vigorously contested,
Circuit Court in

but it has been held by the U.

Iowa, (1)

act is constitutional,
intoxicants to the

of this bill has been

and in

Arkarisas,(2)

state

comnerce,

operation of prohibitory laws in force

to deldgate
as it

that this

that it subjects such impo±'ted

before the original package decisions,
not an attempt

S.

and that it is

the power to regulate inter-

merely fixes the time when the

articles in question shall be deemed a part of the common mass of property in the State, and subject to the
exercise of the police power.

46.

Conclusion.

Upon principles Coo itnt

vith the genius of our

free institutions and the constitutional
rights,

guaranties of

na,, be fairly deduced that the test of all

it

police regulations affecting proprietary: rights is,whether the,
In

public.

requirement,

are enacted in

of the

the real interests

judging whether or not a statute meets this
the courts have a wide field of inquiry.

determine whether the provisions of the act

They ma,

or only

are such as to be essential to the public good,
impose harRassing burdens upon individuals;
on pretense of serving the public,

statute,

wiIether the
diminishes
and

the property of one man to augment that of another;
whether the subject of regulation includes things in
which -the public have no interest,
antagonistid to the general

good.

applying these principles to the exercise of

In

in

the police power of the State over the traffic
cants,

no waw

or rights in

it

has already been shown that,

intoxi-

as pauperism,

vice,

and crime are the usual concomitants of the unrestricted
indulgence of the appetite for strong drink,

it

is

clearl-

constitutional for the State to.prohibit the sale of

47.

spiritous and intoxicating liquors, especially, in drinking saloons; but it has also been shown that the enactment of laws prohibiting the sale of previously

acquired

liquors is an unconstitutional exercise of the police
power,

as that power, in such a case (1), becomes "the

upper of two mill-stones which are crushing the rights
of property into powder."
Any government which deprives its citizens of the
right to engage in any lawful pursuit, subject only to
any reasonable restriction,
lican;

is tyrannical and unrepub-

And, therefore, I have endeavored to show that,-

when a brewer or distiller carn have his establishment
shut up by an amendment of a State constitution or an act
of a State legislature,

making what was previously a

lawful employment criminal, turning what was previously
a lawful commodity of trade into "poison" in a legal
sense,

and depriving his propertyT of its chief value,

for the supposed purpose of promoting the public good,
without paying him an ything for it, -then the maxium,
"Salus populi suprema lex",
mon-law Juggernaut,
vidiual is

becomes (2),

"a sort of com-

beneath the weels of which the indi-

ground to death for the benefit of the rest,

who stand around and clap their hands."

£

Anii

cases", it

in

the consideration of the "orijin-

has beenim

the duty of Con,;css
sults

of experience

desire to show,(1),

in

~J.

_! package

first, that it

is

to keep informed of the ire-

matters of conmnerce,

and to enact,

from time to time, all such regulations, restrictions and
prohibitions as may appear to be necessarl, or expedient,
to protect the people against the abuses of the priveleges
of inter-state traffic,

especiall- in cases on the border

line between State and National authority;
that it is the duty of the State legislatures

and second,
to exer-

cise the police power freely within their respective jurisdictions,

b7

the enactment of suit.',ble laws for the

protection of public interests and p-ivatc rights,
forming such laws, with scrupulous carg
principles declared b:- the courts,
enacted by Congress.

Finis.

con-

to the yuiding

and to the reg-lations
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